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ABSTRACT
In an adaptive security-critical system, security mechanisms change
according to the type of threat posed by the environment. Speci-
fying the behavior of these systems is di cult because conditions
of the environment are di cult to describe until the system has
been deployed and used for a length of time. This paper deines
the problem of adaptation in security-critical systems, and outlines
the RELAIS approach for expressing requirements and specifying
the behavior in a way that helps identify the need for adaptation,
and the appropriate adaptation behavior at runtime. The paper
introduces the notion of adaptation via input approximation and
proposes statistical machine learning techniques for realizing it.
The approach is illustrated with a running example and is applied
to a realistic security example from a cloud-based ile-sharing appli-
cation. Bayesian classiication and logistic regression methods are
used to implement adaptive speciications and these methods ofer
diferent levels of adaptive security and usability in the ile-sharing
application.
CCS CONCEPTS
· Security and privacy; · Software and its engineering;
KEYWORDS
Security requirements, Self-adaptation
1 INTRODUCTION
Requirements for software systems are rooted in an environment
characterized by complex runtime conditions. In adaptive software
systems, some of the runtime conditions are di cult to predict and
approximate until the system has been deployed and used for a
length of time. This poses a challenge for requirements engineering
because incomplete knowledge of the environment can lead to
incorrect speciications and violation of critical requirements at
runtime [27].
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For example, consider the class of security attacks known as
parameter tampering where an attacker modiies the HTTP param-
eter values sent from the client computer to the server computer in
order to escalate privileges. Much of the existing work on detecting
and preventing parameter tampering attacks (such as [22] and [14])
uses domain-speciic constraints by validating the parameter values
both at the client side and the server side. For example, in order
to prevent unauthorized łdiscountž attacks in e-commerce appli-
cations, defense mechanisms against parameter tampering ensure
that the values for the quantity parameter are never negative when
received by the server. These constraints are typically speciied and
implemented before the system becomes operational.
This paper considers cases where it is not possible to write rules
for detecting parameter tampering at design time. For example,
when various subsets of a group of users share documents using a
web-based ile sharing service (such as Dropbox, ownCloud, etc),
one security requirement is to prevent self-inviting, namely that, a
user should not be allowed to invite himself to a shared folder he
does not own. If an attacker is able to intercept a share invitation
and add his own ID as an invitee via parameter tampering (this
attack scenario is discussed further in Section 2.1), it is di cult
to specify at design time the necessary behavior to prevent the
attack because the identities of the attacking and targeted users
are yet unknown. Therefore, design time constraints are largely
inefective for addressing the class of security problems this paper
is considering.
In order to address the problem, this paper proposes an approach
for specifying adaptive security behavior under partial knowledge
of the system environment and for incorporating further knowl-
edge about the environment discovered at runtime into adaptive
speciication. In doing so, this paper makes the following three
contributions. First, the deinition and illustration of a notion of
user-driven adaptation which allows for incomplete knowledge of
the environment but the software and parts of its environment co-
operate at runtime to adapt appropriately (Section 2). Conceptually,
requirements are divided into episodic and run requirements, and
informally, adaptation means the modiication of episodic behavior
in order to satisfy run requirements (Section 3). Second, the im-
plementation of the proposed notion of adaptation at runtime by
means of input approximation: whenever the system receives an
input for which the required output (as demanded by requirements)
is not certain, there is a need for adaptation. The adaptation behav-
ior is identiied by inding a similar input value for which there is a
required output value, and to produce that output value (Section 3).
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The paper proposes an architecture and a method for implementing
input approximation using machine learning techniques. Third, the
demonstration of how parameter tampering attacks against the ile
sharing application ownCloud can be identiied and prevented at
runtime using statistical machine learning methods in a scalable
fashion (Section 4). In particular, the evaluation of Bayesian and
logistic regression methods for identifying possible self-invites in-
dicates that the higher degree of security (fewer missed attacks)
comes at the cost of reduced convenience (more false alarms).
There is a substantial body of work on expressing and analyzing
requirements for adaptation. For instance, Whittle et al. [25, 26]
have proposed RELAX, which supports a fuzzy logic-based ap-
proach to analyzing uncertainty in adaptive systems. Ghezzi et
al. [5] have examined the problem of when to introduce a new
controller to a running system without restarting it, and verifying
that the new controller meets its speciication. Souza et al. [23]
have proposed a method for weakening requirements as a way
to adapt to the changing context. Existing work on partial model-
based reasoning such as [19] has shown how uncertainty in model
reinement can be reduced by deining conditions that need to be
met during model transformation.
The proposed approach is diferent from the existing work on
requirements and speciications for adaptation in two diferent
ways. First, current approaches tend to view adaptation as a way of
avoiding or preventing requirement violations based on design time,
and perhaps runtime, knowledge of the environment. While such
approaches are important, this paper takes the view that adaptation
should also be in response to requirement violations encountered at
runtime without weakening the requirements. Second, adaptation
tends to be regarded essentially as an optimization problem in exist-
ing approaches, where the objective is to choose a system behavior
that gives the highest possible level of requirements satisfaction.
This paper posits that adaptation is not just as an optimization
problem, but also a problem of collaboration between parts of the
environment and the software: typically users in the environment
are able to guide the software to adapt to a certain desired behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
a running example and the adaptation problem that motivates our
work, together with the notions of requirements for security and
adaptation. Section 3 introduces the proposed approach and illus-
trates its features with the running example. Section 4 presents an
evaluation of the use of statistical machine learning approaches to
implementing an adaptive speciication for preventing the parame-
ter tampering attacks. Related work is discussed in Section 5 and
concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the running example, recalls the Problem
Frames notation, and discusses the adaptation problem.
2.1 Parameter Tampering Attacks
The security problem discussed here is related to several related
types of security attacks. Onewell-known type of attack is called the
parameter tampering attack [22] where an attacker intercepts and
modiies data (which has been usually validated on the client side)
in order to gain unauthorized privileges on the server. Another type
of attack is called cookie poisoning [12], where an attack modiies
the values stored on the web browser in order to bypass checks or
escalate privileges. There are also various types of code injection
attacks [1] where it is the code rather than the data that has been
inserted into communication in order to gain unauthorized access
(for alternative names and real-world examples of these attacks,
see [13]).
Figure 1: Network coniguration
Scenario: In the scenario we are considering Alice, Bob, Sam
and Tom work in an organization (Fig. 1). Diferent subgroups of
them work on diferent projects, and they share documents using
ownCloud, a cloud-based ile sharing system. The lead person of
the project creates a project-speciic folder (inviter) and invites
those who work on the project to share that folder (invitees). One
security requirement of this application is that only those invited
by the inviter are able to view the shared folder.
Attack: Bob knows that Alice, Sam, and possibly Tom also will
be working on a secret project in the near future. He knows that
he will not be invited to share the documents in the project folder,
but he wants to see them nevertheless. So he writes a program
that examines all HTTP requests on their oice router to perform
a parameter tampering attack as follows (Fig. 2). Bob’s program
running on the router looks for all HTTP requests for ownCloud
document sharing where the inviter is Alice and invitees include
Sam, and the program adds his own name to the invitee list. It
means that whenever Alice invites Sam to join a folder, Bob also
gets an invite, although it is not sent by Alice.
Followingmuch of the existingwork on detecting and preventing
parameter tampering attacks (such as [22] and [14]), the scenario
above assumes that the attacker can read the communication be-
tween the users and the server. In practice, this assumption can hold
for a number of reasons including: (i) the web application does not
use TLS/SSL, (ii) the attacker has compromised the router (through
DNS hijacking for example), and (iii) the attacker has created an
łevil twinž wii access point [15].
In a parameter tampering attack, an attack may modify parame-
ter values, ield names, and the sequence of values communicated
between the client and the server [22]. It is noted that in parameter
tampering attacks, the attacker may have legitimate interactions
with the system, and the attack itself may be disguised as one.
The general solution to parameter tampering attacks is to check
and enforce static data integrity rules, both on the client side (typ-
ically via JavaScript programs for validating form data) and the
server side (typically through code analysis [12]). This solution,
however, does not apply in our ownCloud example: since Alice may
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Bob Alice OiceRouter ownCloudServer Tom Sam
Run(add_me)
Send(a, t , s)
Send(a, t , s)
Add()
Add()
Add()
Send(a,−b)
Remove()
Figure 2: Attack sequence
sometimes want to share with Bob certain folders, Bob cannot be
removed from invitee lists syntactically. Therefore JavaScript-based
approach will work only if the information Bob inserts into the
request string has distinct characteristics, such as the email address
Bob uses in the attack being diferent from the one he uses for
legitimate sharing. The problem here is that given a share request
containing a group of invitees, we want to ind out how likely is it
that one of the invitees is an attacker (self-invited invitee).
Deinitions: Let U be the inite set of users {a,b, s, t } (abbre-
viations of Alice, Bob, Sam and Tom) who may create and share
documents and folders using ownCloud. An inviter sends an invite
to have other users to allow them access to a folder (for simplicity,
we will leave out details about the folders being shared). The set of
invites Invites is deined as a set of pairs of inviter (er ) and some
invitees (ee).
Invites = {(er , ee ) | (er , ee ) ∈ U × 2U ∧ er < ee ∧ ee , null }
Notationally, we will write an invite as comma separated values
where the inviter has an overline. So, the request whereAlice invites
Sam,Tom, that is the relation (a, {s, t }), is simpliied as a, s, t .
When the server receives such an invite, all invitees are notiied
and they are able to access the shared folder (without having to
accept the invitation to share). We assume that the inviter cannot
be one of the invitees.
Similarly, an inviter sends an uninvite to have someone removed
from the invitee list of a folder.
Uninvites = {(er , ee ) | (er , ee ) ∈ U ×U }
Again, we will write a,−b to say Alice uninvites Bob.
2.2 The Problem Frames Notation
Fig. 3 shows the ownCloud sharing problem using the Problem
Frames notation [8] and the diagram should be read as follows.
At the interface c, the phenomena description ER!{Send(invite),
Send(uninvite)} means that the problem domain Inviter controls
ownCloud
Server
Ofice
Router
Invitees
Inviter
Req
e
d
c a
b
Interface Phenomena
e OR!{Send(invite), Send(uninvite)}
OCS!{Add[U], Remove[U]}
c ER!{Send(invite), Send(uninvite)}
d OR!{Add[U], Remove[U]}
a ER!{share request[EE], unshare request[U]}
b EE!{invited[U], uninvited[U]}
Figure 3: Problem Diagram: Sharing in ownCloud
the events Send(invite) and Send(uninvite), and these events are
observed by the problem domain Ofice Router. Similarly, at the
interface e, Ofice Router controls the events Send(invite) and
Send(uninvite) that are observed by ownCloud Server, and the
events Add[U] and Remove[U] controlled by ownCloud Server are
observed by Ofice Router. Events at the interface d can be read in
the same way.
The behavior of Ofice Router is to send an invite request to
ownCloud Server whenever a request is received. The behavior of
Inviter is such that when theywant to share a folder with some other
users (share request[EE]), they send invites via OficeRouter to
ownCloudServer. Occasionally, when someone needs to be removed
from the invitee list, the inviter sends an uninvite. A sequence of
one invite by a user (namely at OficeRouter), optionally followed
by one uninvite is called a share episode which is deined as:
SE = {⟨i;u⟩|i ∈ Invites ∧ (u ∈ ranдe (i ) ∨ u = null )} (SE)
For example, the share episode ⟨a,b, s;b⟩ says that there is an
invite, where Alice invites Bob and Sam (invitees), and b was subse-
quently removed by a from the list of invitees. In another episode
⟨a,b;−⟩, the inviter is a and the invitee is b, and no-one was unin-
vited.
A requirement is a desired relationship between the variables
referenced and constrained by the requirement, which in this case
is the relationship between share request, unshare request at the
interface a and shared and unshared at the interface b. More specif-
ically, the requirement is a set of pairs of share requests and invited
users, where only those users in the share requests are invited:
Req ≜ {(share request[EE], {invited (u1) . . . invited (un )}) |
EE = {u1 . . .un }}
2.3 The Adaptation Problem
It is di cult to write design-time constraints for when to remove a
user Bob from an invitee list and when not. We observe that this
di culty is related to two issues. First, since the machine ownCloud
Server cannot observe the requirement variables such as EE in the
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Figure 4: Overview of the RELAIS approach
phenomenon ER!share request[EE] directly, but must use the vari-
ableOR!Send(invite) instead, there is a gap between the speciication
phenomena and the requirement phenomena. Second, there is some
uncertainty about the behavior of the environment, and in particular
about Ofice Router. In the relationship between ER!Send(invite)
and OR!Send(invite), for example, the router cannot guarantee that
the invitee lists at the two interfaces are the same. The question
of how unreliable a particular oice router is cannot be known
before the system becomes operational. Given these two issues, it
is di cult to write a weakened speciication at design time that
will satisfy the requirement.
3 THE RELAIS APPROACH
This section discusses and illustrates the key concepts of the RELAIS
(Requirements Engineering Language for Adaptive Information
Security) approach. We will deine these concepts independently of
existing requirements engineering languages (in the style of [17]),
and exemplify them before presenting the Problem Frames-based
syntax. Alternative syntaxes, such as those based on goal- and
agent-oriented requirements notations, are also possible and are
further discussed in Section 5.
The RELAIS approach puts an emphasis on the distinction be-
tween episodic and run requirements. In a reactive system, the
machine is often required to cause a sequence of event occurrences,
perhaps within a time constraint, in response to each occurrence
of a certain environmental event sequence. An episodic require-
ment demands that the corresponding response event sequence
for each environmental event sequence has a certain property. An
environmental event sequence followed by the corresponding re-
sponse sequence is called one behavioral segment. For example, the
sequence of observations projected on the variables share request
and Invited, ⟨sharerequest ({s, t }), {Invited (s ), Invited (t )}⟩ is one
behavioral segment, and its property satisies the requirement Req.
A run requirement demands that several behavioral segments
of a requirement has a certain property. Two examples of an run
requirement are as follows: łthe number of unshare request must
reduce over timež, and łthe ration of unshare requests to share
requests must be less than 1 to 10 at all timesž.
The episodic and run requirements are similar in the sense that
they are properties of the system behavior and that they can be
violated by certain system behaviors. One main diference between
these two types is the span: an episodic requirement is a property of
a single behavioral segment, while a run requirement is a property
of several behavioral segments.
Adaptation in the RELAIS approach means the modiication of
the episodic behavior in order to satisfy run requirements. For ex-
ample, in order to ensure that an unshare request does not happen
for Bob, the speciication of ownCloud Server is modiied so that
Bob is not added to the share folder. One way to achieve this modi-
ication of the behavior is by modifying the value of invite at the
interface e by removing Bob. We call this type of mechanism łinput
approximationž because it is a function that attempts to bridge the
gap between the requirement and speciication phenomena (Sec-
tion 2.3) by approximating the mapping between the invite at the
interface c to the variable at interface e.
As shown in Fig. 4, our approach begins with the separation
of requirements into episodic and run requirements. Episodic re-
quirements are irst speciied. An appropriate input approximation
method is selected and an architecture is selected before a run re-
quirement is speciied. In our discussion of these concepts below,
we will use the notion of observation. As used in the statistics liter-
ature [2], an observation refers to a recorded value of a variable of
a simple or complex data type.
3.1 Observations of the system
We will describe the behavior of system S as a totally ordered inite
set of observations of the vectorV of typed variables ( f1, f2 . . . fn ).
The variables f1, f2 . . . fn in the vector are of speciic types such
as boolean, numeric, textual and so on. For example, the vector
(share request[EE], ER!Send(invite), OR!Send(invite), OCS!Add[U],
OR!Add[U], invited[U]) contains all the variables to describe the
behavior of the ownCloud system in Fig. 3. In this system, the
following sequence of observations describes a behavior in which
Alice invites Tom and Sam (na means not available):
⟨(share request[s, t],na,na,na,na,na);
(na, Send (a, s, t ),na,na,na,na);
(na,na, Send (a, s, t ),na,na,na);
(na,na,na, {Add[s],Add[t]},na,na);
(na,na,na,na, {Add[s];Add[t]},na);
(na,na,na,na,na, {Invited (Sam), Invited (Tom)})⟩
(B1)
Partial observations of V , known as projections of S, are de-
scribed by subscripting the positions of values in the vector. The
relation between full and partial observations is surjective. The irst
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of the ive observations above, and indeed all ive observations, can
be projected on the second variable as Send(a, s, t ). Similarly, the
entire sequence of the six observations in (B1) can be projected and
simpliied as:
⟨share request[s, t]; Send (a, s, t ); Send (a, s, t );Add[s],Add[t];
Add[s],Add[t]; Invited (Sam), Invited (Tom)⟩
Notice that since we are not dealing with real-time constraints in
this work, the sequencing of observations only indicates temporal
ordering. However, time constraints can be handled by including
the clock as one of the observed variables [17].
From the point of view of the machine, the variables in the vector
can be characterized as follows. The machine can read values of
(or observe) some variables in vectorV (such as OR!Send(invite)),
and can assign values to (or control) some of the variables (such
as OCS!Add[U]). The vector may also contain variables that the
machine can neither read from nor write to (such as OR!Add[U].
The variables in the vectormay have causal and logical relationships
between them but those relationships are not deined explicitly in
the vector.
3.2 Episodic Requirements
All possible sequences of observations is denoted as S∗ ⊆ 2S . An
episodic requirement is a relation between two sequences of ob-
servations, Repi ⊆ S
∗ × S∗, where the domain is a sequence con-
taining observations of referenced variables, and the codomain
is a sequence of observations of constrained variables. Since we
will typically project sequences of observations, we will write
an episodic requirement as relation between two projected ob-
servations. For example, the relation (⟨share request[Sam,Tom]⟩1,
⟨Invited (Sam), Invited (Tom)⟩6) says the values of the variables
recorded, without saying anything about values other variables
may have in the behavioral segment.
Episodic requirements may be violated when the environment
does not have the necessary property that the invite list does not
change after the inviter has sent it.
Given some behavior segments such as the following,
⟨share request[s, t]; Send (a, s, t ); Send (a, s, t );Add[s],Add[t];
Add[s],Add[t]; Invited (Sam), Invited (Tom)⟩
we can say whether they satisfy or violate a given requirement.
The predicate Satisfy1 will be used to say this more precisely, where
the subscripts r and c represent the projection of the segment to
the referenced and constrained variables of the requirement:
Satisfy1(seg,Req) ≜ (seqr , seдc ) ∈ Req (Sat1)
Negation of the predicate Satisfy1 means that the segment does not
satisfy the requirement.
3.3 Run Requirements
A property of several segments with respect to a requirement is
called a run requirement. The predicate Satisfy2 can use used to
say this more precisely.
Satisfy2(segs,Req) ≜ ∃s ∈ seдs · Satisfy1(s,Req) (Sat2)
Negation of the predicate Satisfy2means that there is no segment
in the set segs that satisies the requirement. We will use the oper-
ator # in #Satisfy2(segs,Req) to count the number of segments in
seдs satisfying the requirement Req; similarly, #¬Satisfy(segs,Req)
is the number of time Req is not satisied in seдs .
For example, assuming owc contains all behavioral segments
in the ownCloud system, #¬Satisfy2(owc,R) = 0 says that the
requirement Req must never be violated. Similarly, a weaker form
of a run requirement can be expressed as a relative number of the
requirement violation. For example,
#¬Satisfy2(owc,R)
#Satisfy2(owc,R)
≤ 0.1
says that the requirement Rmust not be violated for more 10% of the
time it is satisied. Therefore, even when an episodic requirement
is violated from time to time, the corresponding run requirement
can still be satisied. In this sense, run requirements are regarded
as second-order.
In the ownCloud example, every share episode where someone
is uninvited is a segment of behavior that violates the security
requirement, and every share episode where no-one is uninvited
is a segment of behavior that satisies the security requirement.
The adaptation requirement in this example is to minimize the
number of times the security requirement is violated, meaning that
the number of times a inviter has to uninvite an invitee reduce as
more share requests are processed by the system. This adaptation
requirement is intended to improve security.
Uninvite
Reducer
Share
Episodes
ownCloud
Server
Ofice
Router
Inviter
Invitees
UR
d
f
e
c
e’
g
h
Interface Phenomena
e’ UR!{Send(invite)}
OR!{Send(uninvite)}
f UR!SE}
g SE!{Reduce over time}
Figure 5: Problem Diagram: Adaptation in ownCloud
3.4 Adaptive Speciication
When an episodic speciication can violate its requirements from
time to time, the behavior of the speciication can be improved by
introducing a new adaptive speciication while extending the prob-
lem world. Fig. 5 shows a small extension to the Problem Frames
syntax for writing run requirements. Notice that the lower half of
the diagram contains the same domains as in Fig. 3. One way to
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read the insertion of Uninvite Reducer between ownCloud Server
and Oice Router is in terms of pipes and ilters (as in Unix-like
OSs). Uninvite Reducer acts as a ilter, where the interface e is the
pipe containing some parameter values.
The intuitive idea is that at the point of the circle, Uninvite
Reducer intercepts all send events controlled by Ofice Router, and
Uninvite Reducer can manipulate the values of invite before it
is visible to ownCloud Server. Through the interface f, Uninvite
Reducer maintains all share episodes in the system. Here, Share
Episodes captures the fact that reports of requirement violation by
users by means of unshare request is used to guide the adaptation.
This is related to that of requirements monitors in the ReqMon
framework [18], but is diferent in the sense that it is not a software
instrument and that it is intended to guide the adaptation.
The adaptive speciication Uninvite Reducer can be described as
a function that, given the history of invites and uninvites, calculates
the probability of a user being uninvited later by the inviter. More
speciically, a valid speciication of Uninvite Reducer for such a
requirement needs to answer the question ⟨a,b, s, t ; ?⟩: that is when
a invites b, s and t , how likely is it that any of the recipient is later
uninvited (i.e. a self-invited user)? The possible outcomes are: −
(no-one), b, s or t . The speciication will then remove the likely
self-invited user from the share request so that the inviter does not
have to uninvite the user later.
In a realistic setting, the number of share episodes will be large,
and the uninvite data is noisy because some of the uninvite events
may be due to mistakes by the inviter rather than attacks by a
malicious user. The next section considers the use of statistical
methods for implementing and evaluating Uninvite Reducer.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section describes the use of Bayesian classiiers and the logistic
regression method to implement Uninvite Reducer and evaluate
the performance of both approaches using data generated by sim-
ulations of share episodes in ownCloud. In practice, such data is
available from the access logs on the server.
4.1 Implementation Using Statistical Methods
In order to implement Uninvite Reducer, we can construct a con-
ditional probability model for a share request sr to ind the user
among the invitees of the request mostly likely to be uninvited.
This can be cast as a Bayesian classiication problem for ordinal
class labels or a logistic regression problem.
Let x1, ...,xn be the vectorisation of the user set (that is repre-
senting each member of the set by a binary variable in the vec-
tor), where |U | = n. Let X be the merger of two user vectors
x1, ...,xn ,xn+1, ...,xn+n , so that the irst n number of variables rep-
resent the inviter (therefore, exactly one variable is true in the
group), and the rest are for invitees (therefore, in this group of
variables, the inviter is always false, and one or more other vari-
ables are true). Let the class labels Y be the enumeration |U |, so
that y1, ...,yn denotes the user names. The invitee most likely to
be uninvited in a share request, yˆ, can be calculated as:
yˆ = argmax
i ∈(1..n)
Pr(yi )
2n∏
j=1
Pr(x j |yi ) (1)
ALGORITHM 1: Generate Share Requests
Input: nobs and nuser representing numbers of observations and users
respectively.
Output: A share request matrix.
1 m ← nobs ; n ← nuser ;
2 inviters ← matrix (m, n);
3 invitees ← matrix (m, n); // Empty matrices withm rows and n columns
4 sspace1 ← (1, 01, ..., 0n−1); // A vector for sample space containing one 1 and
n-1 number of 0s
5 for i ← 1 tom do
6 inviters[i, ] ← rand_perm (sspace1); // Random permutation of the
sample vector
7 end
8 invitees ← inviters ;
9 for j ← 1 tom do
10 if invitees[j, k] == 1 then
11 invind ← k ; // invind stores the index of the inviter in the row
12 end
13 sspace2 ← (1, sample (binary, n − 2)) ; // A vector with one 1 and n-2
number of random binary values
14 tmp ← rand_perm (sspace2);
15 newrow ← append (tmp, 0, invind ) ; // Ensure that the inviter is not
an invitee
16 invitees[j, ] ← newrow ;
17 end
18 share_r equests ← column_bind (inviters, invitees ); // Join the
matrices side by side
An alternative to the naive Bayes approach is logistic regres-
sion [7], commonly used when the dependent variable has only
two possible values. In our attack scenario, the dependent vari-
able is the label for potential attackers, denoted as zi , which has
two possible values: a user yi is an attacker (zi = 1) or not (zi =
0). The independent variables are the inviter and invitee vectors
x1, . . . ,xn ,xn+1, . . . ,xn+n . Let p be the probability of an event
zi = 1, and thus, 1 − p is the probability of zi = 0. The logistic
regression model can be built as
log
p
1 − p
= β0 + β1x1 + · · · + βn+nxn+n (2)
where loд is the logarithm and βi is the coeicient for each inde-
pendent variable xi .
4.2 Data
Algorithm 1 is used to generate a matrix containing a given number
of share requests (nobs) for a given number of users (nuser ). There
are two parts in the matrix (share_requests): for the inviters part
(inviters), each user is represented by a binary variable, but only
one of them can take the value 1, and the rest must take the value
0 (only one inviter in every request). The algorithm achieves this
by performing a random permutation of a vector with appropriate
values (Lines 4ś7). For the invitees’ part (invitees), there are two
constraints to satisfy: the inviter must not be an invitee, and the
number of invitees per share request must be greater than zero. The
algorithm achieves this by irst recording the index of the inviter in
each share request (Lines 10ś12), and illing the rest of the columns
with random binary values, before inserting 0 at the position of the
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Figure 6: Performance of Naive Bayes Classiiers
inviter. The algorithm ensures that there is at least one invitee by
adding one 1 in the sample space (Lines 13ś16). The inviters and
invitees matrices are then bound side by side1.
4.3 Labelling
Having generated the share request data, we assign the labels indi-
cating whether each observation is an attack or non-attack. Since
the question of any user being an attacker is a binary classiication
problem, class labels 0 and 1 are used for non-attack and attack
respectively. In the training data, we assign the label 1 to every
observation where a particular inviter is 1, and some invitees in-
cluding the attacker are also 1. All other observations get the label
1All our code in R is available from https://github.com/ttt23/SEAMS-2018.
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Figure 7: Performance of Naive Bayes Classiiers as the num-
ber of share requests increases
0. In the generation of 100 observations with six users, the number
of uninvite cases (label 1) is around 6% (the percentage changes
when the number of users changes). So the balance between the two
labels is hugely in favor of non-attack, which is realistic because in
practice the number of attacks is relatively low. This issue of class
imbalance is well known [9]. Therefore, it is not meaningful to look
at the overall accuracy of classiication. We will instead examine
the accuracy for each class in order to avoid potential bias [21].
4.4 Results
Fig. 6 shows the performance of naive Bayes classiiers as the num-
ber of share requests, as well as the number of episodes where the
attacker is uninvited, increases. In each run, x number of attack
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Figure 8: Performance of Logistic Regression Classiiers
cases are randomly selected, together with a proportional number
of non-attack cases according to the class balance. The igure for
each run is computed by sampling 10 times from the same dataset
of 100 observations (in the style of 10-fold cross validation [10]).
Therefore, for Fig. 6a for example, we have constructed and tested
60 classiiers. When constructing a classiier, the entire dataset is
used for testing in every case.
As Fig. 6a shows, the accuracy for classifying attack cases starts
from around 30% and increases with the attack cases. As the classi-
iers observe more attack cases, the accuracy increases and achieves
100% when six attack observations are made. That is, in order to
identify an attacker correctly, a classiier needs to see at least six
uninvite requests if the number of observations is 100. In contrast,
the accuracy for classifying non-attack cases is always 100%. This
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Figure 9: Logistic regression performance as the total num-
ber of observations increases
is because the classiiers observe only one attack case but several
non-attack cases at the beginning, and are thus biased towards
the non-attack cases. In practice, it means that the users of this
system will not get false positives, but some attack cases will be
missed initially when there are not enough attack cases to sample.
As Fig. 6b and 6c show, the accuracy of classifying attack cases is
close to 100% when the number of attack cases increases to ive.
Fig. 6dÐ6f show the changes in the accuracy as the number of
users increases to nine, and as result the class ratio changes to
around three attack cases in 100 observations. The accuracy of
classifying attack cases is comparable in cases of six users and
nine users if the accuracy per number of attack cases is consid-
ered. Both 6eÐ6f show that accuracy for attack cases is close to
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100% when the observations include six attack cases. In cases of
nine users, the accuracy for classifying non-attack cases is also
perfect, because there is always a suicient number of non-attack
observations even when the number of attack cases is one.
Fig. 7 shows the performance of naive Bayes classiiers as the
total number of observations increases over time, again according to
the class ratio. In each run, x number of observations are randomly
selected from the same dataset of 300 observations, where the
balance between attack and non-attack cases is kept at 6%. The
accuracy of classifying non-attack cases hovers around 100%, while
the accuracy of classifying attack cases gets better slowly. The
increase in the number of users makes the classiiers generally less
accurate for the security cases.
We now construct logistic regression classiiers by using the
model described in Section 4.1 and the same dataset generated in
the naive Bayes experiments. Fig. 8 shows the performance of the
logistic regression approach when the numbers of users and overall
observations vary. Unlike the naive Bayes classiiers, the accuracy
of the logistic classiiers for classifying both non-attack and attack
cases starts from around 85% and 60% respectively (Fig. 8aÐ8c). The
accuracy gets better as the number of attack observations increases.
In order to identify both an attack and non-attack cases correctly,
the classiiers need to observe at least four attack cases and around
64 non-attack cases. Increasing the number of users (Fig. 8dÐ8f)
has little impact on the performance when the number of attack
cases are comparable.
Finally, Fig. 9 shows the performance of logistic regression clas-
siiers when the total number of instances increases according to
class ratio. It shows that accuracy for attack cases is zero until
around 17 instances are observed when the number of users is six
(Fig. 9aÐ9c), suggesting that the classiiers need to see at least two
attack cases (similar to Fig. 7). The same is true when there are nine
users. Accuracy for both cases improves as the number of combined
instances increases.
In general, it shows that both approaches performwell for detect-
ing potential attack cases. When there is a short history of uninvite,
Naive Bayes is generally good at identifying non-attack cases but
is poor at identifying attack cases. On the other hand, the logistic
regression method can identify attack cases with high accuracy
even when there are few attack observations. The downside is that
these classiiers also give a higher number of false positives, as
some of the non-attack cases are incorrectly classiied as attack
cases, especially when the accuracy for the attack cases picks up.
5 RELATEDWORK
Since this paper is primarily about requirements and speciication
of systems with adaptive security behavior, the work discussed
here is related to the areas of requirements engineering for adaptive
security systems, the use of statistical approaches to security and the
detection and prevention of parameter tampering attacks. Existing
research on the modeling of security requirements, threats, and
requirements evolution is not directly related to this work and is
therefore not covered here.
5.1 Adaptation
There are several related notions around the term adaptation includ-
ing context-awareness, and self-adaptation. Many of these notions
and their signiicance to research have been discussed many times
previously (for instance [20]). Instead of repeating the discussion,
we will focus on how the term adaptation is used.
Perhaps the earliest example of adaptation is PID controller,
which uses feedback from the environment to compute deviation
from the desired target value and applies correction when neces-
sary. The notion of adaptation described in this paper is similar
to that. However, our focus is on the requirements, and how they
can be structured. Broy et al. [3] give a deinition of adaptation,
which allows us to distinguish adaptive behavior from non-adaptive
behavior. According to their deinition, a system is non-adaptive if
its behavior is determined exclusively by the user input. A system
is adaptive if the output is determined both by the input values
the user provides to the system, as well as other values (they are
called indirect/implicit inputs) available to the system, which the
user may or may not be aware of. Therefore, from the user’s point
of view, the machine may appear non-deterministic, although the
system is not actually non-deterministic, since it uses implicit input
values to determine the behavior. The implicit values are part of the
context. Adaptation is non-transparent if the user cannot observe
the context that afects the machine behavior; transparent if the user
can observe part of the context but not change it; and diverted if
the user can control part of the context. The main limitation of this
deinition is that adaptation is fundamentally about the user’s per-
ception of how their input is processed by the machine. Critically,
in their deinition a user does not guide the system from exhibiting
unwanted behavior to exhibiting wanted behavior. Furthermore,
their notion of adaptation does not distinguish between those parts
of the environment that may cooperate and those that may not
when adapting, which is critical in security problems.
5.2 Requirements Engineering Approaches to
Adaptation
RELAX [26] proposes a way of writing declarative requirements
in order to allow for environmental uncertainty. To achieve this,
requirements engineers irst separate requirements that must be
satisied at all times (invariants) from requirements that do not have
to be satisied under certain environmental conditions. Require-
ments in the latter category are rephrased using special operators
to indicate the fact that they may not be fully satisied, if at all,
from time to time, due to some uncertainty about the environmen-
tal properties. Those operators include AS MANY AS POSSIBLE,
and AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. What the RELAX language and the
approach provide is a way of weakening requirements at design
time so that the speciications allow more behavior that can satisfy
the requirements under diferent environmental conditions. In our
example, it means rewriting requirements such as Req by adding
operators for weakening it. However, such weakened requirements
are in general non-deontic (non-obligatory) in the sense that the
system is no longer obliged to satisfy them at all.
Conceptually, the improvement we have brought over the RE-
LAX approach is a way of relating run requirements with episodic
requirements. As a result episodic requirements are still binding,
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and that adaptation is achieved not just by relaxing, but by allowing
the speciication for run requirements to modify the speciication
of the episodic requirements. The user is expected to help ‘correct’
the system behavior over time through error reporting. User partic-
ipation is therefore fundamental to our notion of adaptation. Unlike
our approach, RELAX provides no implementation architecture for
adaptation, and as a result it is not clear how the user might (not)
be involved in the adaptation process, and how the system may
change its behavior if the user can help identify unwanted behavior.
Finally, RELAX allows uncertainty in both the input values and
the output values (system actions). We are currently restricted to
uncertainty in input values but not in output values.
In theADAMapproach for handling uncertainty in non-functional
requirements, such as response time and usability, there are two
main levels of abstraction [6]. In the modeling phase, they irst
describe the łabstract functionalitiesž of a system, i.e. the system
implementing the functional requirements, using a worklow, such
as a UML activity diagram. Each abstract functionality may have
one or more concrete implementations. Each implementation has
annotations of their impact on non-functional requirements. For
example, the łproduct lookupž abstract functionality may be imple-
mented by an API call to searchupc.com, or through manual input
of the user. For each implementation, there will be diferent values
for response time, usability and energy consumption. The problem
is to ind a composition of the concrete functionalities at runtime
that give the best satisfaction of all non-functional requirements.
There are some similarities with our approach, such as the proba-
bilistic characterization of the environment, and incompleteness of
knowledge about the environment at design time. One key, perhaps
complementary, diference is that we are concerned with inding the
most likely correct input value, before choosing the output value
that is already associated by the requirement with the input value.
In other words, once the input is known, the output is certain. In
their work, that is not the case. They are concerned with choosing
output values that will satisfy non-functional requirements to the
best extent possible. However, unlike in the RELAIS approach, their
speciications of non-functional requirements do not modify the
behavior of concrete functionalities: they simply choose the best
coniguration of the pre-deined behaviors.
The notion of awareness requirements [23, 24] has also been
used to describe the requirements for adaptation and evolution in
software systems. Awareness requirements are about the success
and failure of other requirements. An awareness requirement for
example can state that a particular requirement must never fail.
Similarly, it can also state the ratio of success to failure, or state
the trend over time and so on. Patterns of awareness requirements
have been presented in [24].
There are some similarities between their work and the RELAIS
approach. Their notion of an awareness requirement is similar to the
notion of run requirements, but our treatment of run requirements
as a property of behavioral segments is more precise. Both episodic
and run requirements in the RELAIS approach are properties of
system behavior, rather than properties and properties of properties.
More importantly, run requirements are not just about expressing
the desired properties, but also about modifying the behavior of
episodic speciications in order to adapt.
There are several architectural approaches to dealing with adap-
tation [11, 16, 28]. An important theme in this line of work is the
description and analysis of how components and their connections
may change at runtime in response to environmental conditions.
The general architecture for adaptation used by RELAIS is similar
to the wrapper architectural style. The RELAIS approach also em-
phasizes the role of requirements and how they can be structured
in order to highlight the need for adaptation at runtime.
5.3 Statistical approaches for security
Anomaly detection techniques [4] have been applied extensively for
improving security (such as in intrusion detection in computer net-
works), fraud detection in banking systems and so on. Classiication
techniques are frequently used when partial labels are available.
In this work, we have shown that classiication techniques can be
used for adaptation as well as for security.
5.4 Detecting and Preventing Parameter
Tampering Attacks
Much of the existing work on parameter tampering attacks use
syntax-based approaches to detect and prevent potential attacks.
These approaches include static analysis of design for potential
weaknesses [12], and dynamic analysis to prevent attacks [22],
and they tend to assume that the attackers are not insiders, and
therefore have not legitimate access to the systems. In our attack
scenarios, we assume that attackers are insiders, and are therefore
more di cult to detect. As a result, the detection of potential attack
cannot be sound: it will depend on the availability of good training
data. Having said that we have shown that generic classiication
algorithms can learn to accurately classify the attacks very quickly.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a notion of runtime adaptation for security-
critical systems, where knowledge about the environment is partial
at design time. The challenge is to use knowledge discovered at run-
time to identify appropriate adaptation behavior in order to improve
the system security. We have described the input approximation
method for adaptation, and how the method can be implemented
using constraint-based program methods and statistical machine
learning techniques. Unlike existing approaches that aim to prevent
security breaches at runtime, the RELAIS approach aims to exploit
knowledge about the environment discovered at runtime (during
failures), and use the knowledge to identify appropriate adaptation
behavior in the future. The proposed approach is particularly useful,
both conceptually and practically, when dealing with parameter
tampering attacks where it is not possible to design all the defense
mechanisms at design time. Having said that, we suggest that adap-
tation via input approximation is a general concept that can be
applied to any system whose behavior is determined by its input
values and we plan to explore this in future work.
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